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We develop a simple information-based model of FDI flows in which the abundance of
“intangible" capital in the source countries, which generates expertise in cream-skimming
investment projects in the host countries and enhances FDI flows. Corporate transparency in the host
countries, on the other hand, diminishes the value of this expertise and thereby reduces the flow of
FDI. Empirical evidence (from a sample of 12 source countries and 45 host countries over the 1980s
and 1990s) which is analyzed in a gravity equation model provides some support to our theoretical
hypotheses. The gains from FDI in the host country in our model are reflected in a more e.cient size
of stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. These gains depend crucially (and
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Abstract
We develop a simple information-based model of FDI ﬂows in which the abundance of “intangible"
capital in the source countries, which generates expertise in cream-skimming investment projects in
the host countries and enhances FDI ﬂows. Corporate transparency in the host countries, on the
other hand, diminishes the value of this expertise and thereby reduces the ﬂow of FDI. Empirical
evidence (from a sample of 12 source countries and 45 host countries over the 1980s and 1990s) which
is analyzed in a gravity equation model provides some support to our theoretical hypotheses. The
gains from FDI in the host country in our model are reﬂected in a more eﬃcient size of stock of
domestic capital and its allocation across ﬁrms. These gains depend crucially (and inversely) on the
degree of competition among FDI investors.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing faster than world GDP, and is becoming a major
component of foreign investment.1 Indeed, empirical studies distinguish this form of capital ﬂows from
other forms, such as portfolio-equity and debt ﬂows. We usually observe both one-way ﬂows of FDI,
from developed to developing economies, and two-way ﬂows among developed economies. The purpose
of this paper is to explore some unique features of FDI associated with information and transparency,
that make it stand out among the various forms of capital ﬂows.
We identify from empirical data two main categories of variables that signiﬁcantly explain FDI
inﬂows. First, a positive correlation between the industry specialization in the source countries and
∗We wish to thank Benjamin Bental for very useful comments on an earlier draft and Prakash Loungani for many
insightful discussions.
†International Monetary Fund
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§Tel-Aviv University
1See, for example, the case of Australia; The Australian Productivity Commission (2002).
1FDI ﬂows into the host countries is shown to exist. Second, countries with higher quality of corporate
transparencies and stronger capital market institutions, attract less FDI ﬂows.
We incorporate these new considerations in a gravity model of capital ﬂows. Such models have proved
useful in explaining bilateral trade ﬂows and, more recently, cross-border equity ﬂows (Portes and Rey,
2000 and Portes, Rey and Oh, 2001). There has been some initial exploration of the determinants of
FDI in gravity models (Wei, 2000), but not focusing on the role of information as we do here.
In this paper we ﬁrst develop a simple information-based model, that is consistent with empirical
ﬁndings. We interpret the industry specialization in the source country as providing a comparative
advantage to the potential foreign direct investors, in eliciting good investment opportunities in the host
country, relative to domestic investors in the latter country. This advantage may stem, for instance, from
the ability of FDI investors to apply better industry-speciﬁc micro-management standards (“intangible
capital"). In our model this element is captured by assuming a lower cost of cream-skimming (of high-
productivity ﬁrms) on the part of foreign direct investors. This advantage of FDI investors in their
cream-skimming skills is less pronounced when corporate transparencies and capital market institutions
are of high quality in which case FDI inﬂows are less abundant.2 The magnitude of the non-traditional
gains from trade that arise in our model depends crucially (and inversely) on the degree of competition
among potential FDI investors over the domestic ﬁrms. These gains can shrink to zero if there is no
such competition altogether.
Our model also suggests that the gains from FDI are reﬂected in a more eﬃcient size of the stock of
domestic capital and its allocation across ﬁrms. Domestic ﬁrms that are controlled by FDI investors are
typically the “cream" (high-productivity ﬁrms).The magnitude of the non-traditional gains from trade
that arise in our model depends crucially (and inversely) on the degree of competition among potential
FDI investors over the domestic ﬁrms. These gains can shrink to zero if there is no such competition
altogether. Also, FDI inﬂows enlarge the size of the aggregate stock of domestic capital (under plausible
assumptions). This result is consistent with empirical evidence. For instance, Borenzstein, DeGregoris
and Lee (1998) and Bosworth and Collins (1999) provide such evidence for a sample of developing
countries during the period 1978-1995. More recently, Hecht, Razin and Shinar (2002) ﬁnd in similar
samples that the eﬀect of FDI inﬂows on domestic investment is signiﬁcantly larger than either portfolio
equity or loan inﬂows; see table A1 in the appendix. They provide also evidence that FDI inﬂows
promote eﬃciency: The eﬀe c to fF D Io nG D Pg r o w t hi sh i g h e rt h a nt h ee ﬀect of other inﬂows, after
2See also Razin and Sadka (2002).
2controlling for the eﬀect of capital accumulation on GDP growth; see table A2 in the appendix.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a simple information-based model of
FDI. Section 3 compares FDI inﬂows with portfolio equity inﬂows. Section 4 confronts the theory with
evidence. Section 5 concludes.
2 FDI and High-Productivity Skimming
Suppose there is a very large number (N) of ex-ante identical domestic ﬁrms in a certain industry. Each
ﬁrm employs capital input (K), in the ﬁrst period, in order to produce a single composite good in the
second period. We assume that capital depreciates at the rate δ(< 1). Output in the second period is
equal to F(K)(1+ε), where F(·) is a production function exhibiting diminishing marginal productivity
of capital and ε is bounded below by −1, so that output is always non-negative; for notational ease we
also assume that ε is bounded from above by 1. Suppose that ε is purely idiosyncratic, so that there is
no aggregate uncertainty. Consumer-investors are well diversiﬁed and will thus behave in a risk-neutral
way. We denote by G(·) the cumulative distribution function of ε, and by g(·)=G0(·) the corresponding
density function.
At the starting point of the decision process of agents in the ﬁrst period, the productivity factor
(ε) of each ﬁrm is not revealed with full accuracy. Rather, each ﬁrm receives a signal ε0 about its
productivity, which is common knowledge.3 The true ε of the ﬁrm is within an interval of ±β around
ε0. Formally, given ε0 t h et r u ev a l u eo fε is distributed according to the distribution of the productivity
factor, conditional on its being in the interval (ε0 − β, ε0 + β):
ϕ(ε/ε0)=
G(ε) − G(ε0 − β)
G(ε0 + β) − G(ε0 − β)
, (1)
where ϕ(ε | ε0) denotes the cumulative distribution function of ε, conditional on the signal ε0. We assume
that the signal ε0 is distributed according to G(·).
After the signal ε0 is received, the ﬁrm chooses the level of the capital stock (and investment),






F[K(ε0)](1 + ε)+( 1− δ)K(ε0)
1+r
− [K(ε0) − (1 − δ)K0]
¾
dϕ(ε/ε0), (2)
3One can think of this signal as sort of encapsulated information, provided by up-to-date ﬁnancial statements.
3where δ is the rate of depreciation4, (1 − δ)K0 is the initial stock of capital, and r is the world rate of













[1 + E(ε/ε0)] = r + δ, (3)
where E(ε/ε0) is the conditional expected value of the productivity factor, given that this factor lies





Suppose that there is a screening (or search) technology that at some ﬁxed cost per ﬁrm can elicit the
true value of the productivity factor of the ﬁrm, ε. A potential buyer can apply the technology after she
acquires and gains control of the ﬁrm. We assume that foreign direct investors have a cutting-edge
advantage over domestic investors in extracting information about the true value of the ﬁrm. If foreign
direct investors acquire a domestic ﬁrm, they can apply their superior micro-management skills in order
to elicit the true value of ε. This advantage stems from “intangible capital" (specialized knowledge)
in this particular industry. The basic idea is that ﬁrms get involved in foreign operations to exploit
this unique advantage that they have accumulated over time in their base country. This advantage is
modelled here as a lower screening cost for foreign direct investors than for domestic investors. Formally,
the cost per ﬁr mf o raf o r e i g nd i r e c ti n v e s t o ri sCF, which is lower than CD, the cost for a domestic
investor.
I ft h et r u ev a l u eo fε were to be known, then the ﬁrm would choose an optimal capital stock, denoted
by K∗(ε), according to the marginal productivity condition:
F0[K∗(ε)](1 + ε)=r + δ. (5)
Given the signal ε0, a potential foreign direct investor knows that the true value of ε must lie between
ε0 − β and ε0 + β, and that, at a cost CF, she will be able to elicit the true value of ε if she purchases
4Because we assume that there is a single, composite good, which serves both for investment and for consumption, we
implicitly allowed the optimal K to be below (1 − δ)K0.





F[K∗(ε)](1 + ε)+( 1− δ)K∗(ε)
1+r
− [K∗(ε) − (1 − δ)K0
¾
dϕ(ε/ε0). (6)
Her net bid price is P(ε0) − CF. Because CF is lower than CD, the bid price of the foreign direct
investor is higher than that of the domestic investor.
Given the signal ε0, the value of information to the FDI investor, that is the value of eliciting the
true productivity of ﬁrm is P(ε0) − V (ε0). The cost is CF. In order to incur this cost, the value of
information must exceed this cost. Naturally one would expect the value of information to rise with
ε0. This is because the deviations of the state (ε)−independent K(ε0) over the interval (ε0 − β,ε0 + β)
from the state-dependent K∗(ε) over this interval [and, consequently, the deviations of F(K(ε0)) from
F(K∗(ε)) over this interval] are magniﬁed by the productivity factor 1+ε. We therefore assume indeed
that P(ε0) − V (ε0) rises with ε0. Hence, there exists some cutoﬀ level of the signal, denoted by ε0
0, such
that for all ε0 <ε 0
0, the diﬀerence P( ε0) − V (ε0) is negative, and for all ε0 >ε 0
0, the bid-ask price
diﬀerence is positive. Thus, all the ﬁrms that receive a low-productivity signal will be retained by the
original (domestic) owners, and all the ﬁrms that receive a high-productivity signal will be acquired
by foreign direct investors, who manage to outbid their domestic counterparts. The cutoﬀ level of the
signal depends on the screening cost C and is deﬁned by:
P[ε0
0(C)] − C = V [ε0
0(C)]. (7)




Our assumption that P(ε0) − V (ε0) rises with ε0 implies also that as the screening cost (CF) of the
FDI investors falls, the cutoﬀ productivity level (that is ε0
0F) declines with ε0 as well. This means that
with a fall in ε0
01 more ﬁrms will be acquired by FDI investors. Therefore, a lower screening cost of FDI
investors gives rise to a larger volume of FDI inﬂows. By the same token, as the signal becomes more
accurate (that is, as β becomes smaller), the beneﬁt of the screening technology, which is P(ε0)−V (ε0),
declines. Therefore, the advantage of FDI investors in their cream-skimming skills is less pronounced
and FDI inﬂows are expected to be less abundant.
After the signals are revealed, then a ﬁrm with a signal ε0, below ε0
0F, actually adjusts its capital
stock to a signal-dependent, productivity-independent level K(ε0). But a ﬁrm which receives a signal ε0
above ε0
0F expects to adjust its capital stock to a productivity-dependent level K∗(ε) with a commulative


















3 Portfolio versus FDI Inﬂows
To understand the unique role of FDI, suppose now that instead of FDI inﬂows there are only portfolio
inﬂows. That is, assume that the world rate of interest/return (r) continues to prevail in the home
country. Management under portfolio equity ownership, however, may be plagued by a "free-rider"
problem. As noted succinctly by Oliver Hart (2000), “If the shareholder does something to improve the
quality of management, then the beneﬁts will be enjoyed by all shareholders. Unless the shareholder
is altruistic, she will ignore this beneﬁcial impact on other shareholders and so will under-invest in the
activity of monitoring or improving management." In our case, we simply assume that foreign portfolio
equity buyers will not be willing to incur the cost of eliciting the true productivity of the ﬁrm whose
equity they purchase.
In this case, domestic investors acquire and gain control of the ﬁrms with high-productivity signals.
Domestic and foreign portfolio investors acquire all the other ﬁrms (with low-productivity signals). The
cutoﬀ level of the signal in this case is ε0
0D ≡ ε0
0(CD). Because CD >C F, it follows that ε0
0F <ε 0
0D
[recall that P(ε0)−V (ε0) is increasing in ε0, by assumption]. Thus, the diﬀerence in investment between
the two regimes lies only in the range of signals between ε0
0F and ε0
0D. The capital stock of a ﬁrm with a
signal below ε0
0F is the same in the two regimes. The expected capital stock of a ﬁrm with a signal above
ε0
0D will also be the same in the two regimes. But a ﬁrm which receives a signal ε0 in-between these two
cutoﬀ levels, will invest a signal-dependent K(ε0) in the portfolio regime compared to a productivity-
dependent schedule, K∗(ε), with a cummulative distribution ϕ(ε/ε0), in the FDI regime. Naturally, the
latter is more eﬃcient in the sense that it yields a higher expected return.5
The economic gains from FDI, relative to portfolio inﬂows, consist of the eﬃciency of investment
5We have assumed that the only advantage of FDI investors over domestic investors lies in the search/screening cost.
Naturally, if we were to assume that FDI investors can also obtain better information about the true ε ( w eh a v ea s s u m e d
that both can accurately elicit ε), then the diﬀerence between the two regimes expands to the entire range of [−1,1] of
signals.
6and the lower screening cost of FDI investors. Note that because it is the same world interest rate (r)
that prevails in the home country in the two regimes, it follows that the gains from FDI in our case do
not include the traditional gains from opening up the domestic capital market to foreign capital inﬂows.
(These traditional gains are present also in the portfolio regime.) In the FDI regime the ﬁrms with
signals above the cutoﬀ signal ε0
0F are screened; whereas in the portfolio ﬂow regime a small set of
ﬁrms, namely only the ﬁrms with signals above ε0
0D >ε 0
0F are screened. Therefore, the gains stemming






[P(ε0) − CF − V (ε0)]dG(ε0). (10)
In addition, for the ﬁrms that are screened in the two regimes (that is, the ﬁrms with signals above
ε0
0D), the screening cost is lower under the FDI regime than under the portfolio ﬂow regime. This gives
rise to a further gain from FDI which is
GAINC =( CD − CF)[1 − G(ε0
0D)]. (11)
Observe that the entire gain of the lower screening cost of FDI investors is captured by the domestic
economy because of assumed perfect competition among these investors over the domestic ﬁrms. This
is because competition among FDI investors will drive up the price they pay for a domestic ﬁrm to their
net bid price [that is, P(ε0) − CF ] which exceeds the ask price of the domestic owners [that is, V (ε0)],
except for the cutoﬀ ﬁrm (for which the bid price and ask price are equal to each other). Thus, the
total gain from FDI is





[P(ε0) − CF − V (ε0)]dG(ε0)+ (12)
(CD − CF)[1 − G(ε0
0D)].
Note, however, that in the extreme opposite case of a single FDI investor, she will never oﬀer a price
for a domestic ﬁrm above the price that will be oﬀered by domestic investors which is P(ε0) − CD, as
long as this price is above or equal to the ask price of the domestic owner which is V (ε0). Thus, the price
a tw h i c ht h ef o r e i g nd i r e c ti n v e s t o rw i l lb u yad o m e s t i cﬁrm with a signal ε0 is Max[P(ε0)−CD,V(ε0)].
Because P(ε0
0D) − CD = V (ε0
0D), it follows that P(ε0) − CD <V(ε0) in the interval (ε0
0F,ε 0
0D). This
means that the ﬁrms in this interval are purchased by the foreign direct investor at the ask price V (ε0).
7Hence, GAINE,w h i c hi st h ee ﬃciency gain of investment, vanishes. Similarly, ﬁrms in the interval
[ε0
OD,1] will be purchased at the price P(ε0) − CD [rather than P(ε0) − CF in the competitive case].
Hence, GAINC vanishes as well. Thus, as expected, the entire gains from FDI accrue to the single
FDI investor. A possible remedy for the host country to retain some of the gains of FDI is to impose
some sort of ﬂoors to the sale prices of domestic ﬁrms. Another partial remedy for the host country is
to impose a (source-based) capital gains tax on FDI investors. In the intermediate case of imperfect
competition among a few FDI investors, the gains from FDI are split between the host country and the
FDI investors.
We have already established that the utilization of the capital stock (its aggregate level and distribu-
tion over ﬁrms) is more eﬃcient in the FDI regime than in the portfolio regime. Is the capital stock also
larger in the former regime than in the latter regime? Recall that the fundamental diﬀerence between
the two regimes is the screening cost C. Therefore, the above question can be rephrased as whether a
decline in the search cost increases the aggregate stock of capital. In order to answer this question, we











0(C),K (ε0) and E[K∗(ε)/ε0] are deﬁned by equations (7), (3) and (8), respectively.




















































If H is convex, then it follows from Jensen’s inequality that d ¯ K/dC is negative (because dε0
0/dC > 0).
Indeed, one may plausibly assume that H is convex (for instance, this is the case with a Cobb-Douglas
production function), in which case d ¯ K/dC < 0. That is: The aggregate capital stock is larger under
t h er e g i m eo fF D Ii n ﬂows than under the regime of portfolio inﬂows.
4 Evidence from a Gravity Model
Gravity models postulate that bilateral international ﬂows (goods, FDI, etc.) are positively related to
the size of two economies (e.g. population, GDP), and negatively to the distance (physical or other such
as tariﬀs, information asymmetries, etc.) between them.6 In this section we confront our theoretical
ﬁndings with evidence provided by a gravity model of bilateral FDI ﬂows. This model attempts to
explain the determinants of the mobility of FDI across countries over and above what can be explained
by goods trade.
4.1 Speciﬁcication of the gravity equation
The FDI gravity equation in our empirical analysis has inward FDI ﬂows as the dependent variable. A
key determinant of these ﬂows in our theory is the skimming cost advantage of FDI investors over other
investors which stems from “intangible capital" accumulated through industry (or niche) specialization
in the source countries. The basic idea is that countries with a high degree of specialization are assumed
to have high levels of intangible capital (specialized knowledge) by virtue of the fact that the productive
energies of the countries’ ﬁrms have been focused on a smaller number of activities/industries (niches).
Hence a higher degree of specialization in the source countries increases the cost advantage of FDI
investors and is expected to generate more FDI ﬂows to the host economies. We therefore include
a measure of industry specialization (a proxy for intangible capital) in the source countries as an
explanatory variable.
6For instance, using population as the size variable, Loungani, Mody and Razin (2002) ﬁnd that imports are less than
proportionately related to the host country population, while they are close to increasing proportionately with the source
country population. Correspondingly, FDI ﬂows increase by more than proportionately with both the source and the host
country populations.
9Note that industry specialization is associated with more trade in goods. The later phenomenon
may be associated also with higher FDI ﬂows. For instance, vertical FDI ﬂows by multinationals are
naturally associated with more trade (in intermediate goods). We must therefore isolate the additional
contribution to FDI ﬂows of industry specialization, over and above what is generated through trade
ﬂows. For this purpose, we ﬁrst estimate an auxiliary gravity equation with imports of goods as the
dependent variable and export concentration in the source countries among the explanatory variables.
The other explanatory variables and the estimation results are described in Table 1. These results are in
line with the existing literature on trade in goods.7 The coeﬃcients of the scale variables (populations)
are signiﬁcantly positive; the coeﬃcients of the GDP per capita variables (proxies for the degree of
development) are signiﬁcantly positive; the coeﬃcient of the distance variable is signiﬁcantly negative;
the coeﬃcient of the telephone traﬃc variable (instrumented to take into account a possibility of reverse
causality) is positive, and the eﬀects of the source-country export concentration and its interaction with
the source-country GDP are insigniﬁcant. The residual variable from this auxiliary equation is then
taken as an explanatory variable in our gravity FDI equations.
A second explanatory variable provided by our theory has to do with the accuracy of the productivity
signals in the host countries. The more accurate are the signals, the less pronounced is the beneﬁto f
the cream-skimming advantage of the FDI investors, and the less abundant are FDI ﬂows to the host
countries. This explanatory variable is represented in the gravity regression by two measures. One
measure is taken from La Porta et al (2000). What we want to represent is the degree of corporate
transparency that diminishes the power of the insiders (in eliciting the true productivity factor of the
ﬁrm and employing a productivity-dependent investment strategy). We employ a measure of creditor
rights (on a scale of one to ﬁve). We conjecture that such rights go hand-in-hand with corporate
transparency. An empirical problem with this measure is that we have only international cross-section
variations of this measure. Another measure, that needs some elaboration, is the debt-equity ratio in
the host countries: As banks are the main providers of debt capital and they usually conduct rigorous
scrutiny of the credit worthiness of their debtors, we conjecture that, ceteris paribus, ﬁrms with high
debt-equity ratio tend to be more transparent. The data for this measure spans over both time and
countries.
The list of the 12 source countries in our sample is given in Panel A of Table 2. All of the source
countries are industrialized countries. It is likely that these countries account for an overwhelming
7See, for instance, Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Eichengreen and Irwin (1998).
10majority of all FDI outward ﬂows. The list of the 45 host countries is given in Panel B of Table 2.
These consist of the major industrialized countries, several emerging markets (e.g. Brazil and Malaysia)
and some developing countries (e.g. Colombia and Ecuador). There are also a number of oil-producing
countries (e.g. Kuwait and Nigeria).
The sample period consists of the 1980s and the 1990s and is split up into six sub-periods of equal
length, as listed in Panel C of Table 2. The data on the dependent and independent variables are all
averaged over each three-year sub-period. This eliminates some of the noise in the annual data but
preserves a suﬃcient degrere of time series variation.
The dependent variable is the (log of) real FDI ﬂows measured in US dollars from one of the source
countries to one of the host countries.
There are three categories of independent (explanatory) variables: (1) a set of “gravity variables"
that are commonly used in gravity models; (2) a measure of industry-specialization in the source country,
as proxied by its commodity export concentration; (3) the degree of development of the host country’s
ﬁnancial markets, as proxied by per-capita GDP.
The “gravity variables" in turn consist of the following: (i) the (logs of) the sizes of the population
of the host and source countries; (ii) (log) of the “greater circle distance" between the economic centers
in the source-host pair of countries; (iii) instrumented telephone traﬃc.
4.2 Findings
Our results, based on a panel Tobit estimation, are shown in Table 3. The regression contains source
country ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimation results for the gravity FDI equations are presented in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 3. The two regression equations are identical, except that in column (2) we include
also a measure of the host-country creditor rights as an explanatory variable.
The eﬀects of the gravity variables are more or less as expected. The coeﬃcients of the scale variables
(population sizes) are positive and signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. The eﬀects of distance variables
are as expected: (i) the coeﬃcient of the physical distance variable is negative, though insigniﬁcant,
unlike in the trade equation where it was signiﬁcant (see Table 1). This suggests that physical distance
serves as a stronger barrier for trade in goods than for FDI ﬂows; (2) the coeﬃcient of the instrumented
telephone traﬃc is positive and signiﬁcant at the one-percent level, pointing to the importance of the
ease of communication in overcoming physical distance. Note that this eﬀect was not found signiﬁcant
in the trade equation, possibly because communication is more relevant for information-driven FDI than
for trade in goods.
11The coeﬃcient of the trade residual variable is positive and signiﬁcant at the one or ﬁve-percent
level. This indicates a complementarity between imports of goods and FDI inﬂows.
The degree of ﬁnancial development of the host country, as proxied by the host-country GDP per
capita, does not seem to play a signiﬁcant role in attracting FDI, but it is signiﬁcant for promoting trade
in goods.8 Note that for a given population size, total GDP increases with GDP per capita. Therefore,
it is possible that GDP per capita in our trade gravity equation captures the role of total GDP which
is expected to be positively correlated with intra-industry trade. The degree of ﬁnancial development
of the source-country has a positive and signiﬁcant (at the one-percent level) eﬀect on FDI ﬂows.
The main focus of our analysis is the eﬀects of industry specialization in the source countries and
corporate transparency in the host countries. The ﬁrst eﬀect is found to be positive and signiﬁcant
at the one-percent level, as predicted by our theory. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term between
industry specialization and source-country GDP is negative and signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. A
possible interpretation is that as the size of the domestic market (as measured by total GDP) in the
source-country increases and there are more investment opportunities at home, direct investment is
diverted away from foreign markets to the domestic market. The coeﬃcient of the debt-equity ratio
in the host country is negative and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level, when the measure of the host-
country creditor rights is not included in the regressions. When this measure is included, the coeﬃcient
of the debt-equity ratio variable becomes more negative and signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. As
explained before, the debt-equity ratio may be associated with a higher degree of corporate transparency.
As predicted by our theory, this reduces the cost-advantage of FDI investors in screening host-country
ﬁr m sa n dl e a d st ol e s sF D Ii n ﬂows. The coeﬃcient of the measure of creditor rights in the host country
is negative, as our theory suggests, but is insigniﬁcant.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We developed a model in which foreign direct investors are better equipped and experienced in skim-
ming the “good" ﬁrms than their domestic counterparts. Employing this technology, the foreign direct
investors are able to outbid domestic and foreign portfolio investors for the good ﬁrms. We emphasize
this feature of FDI which is better hands-on management standards that entails a cutting-edge advan-
tage over other investors in reacting in real time to a changing business environment. This feature is
more pronounced in high-productivity ﬁrms, resulting in “cream-skimming" of domestic ﬁrms by FDI
8Naturally, GDP per-capita may be a proxy for many other features.
12investors. Note that this mechanism applies both to mergers and acquisitions and to greenﬁeld invest-
ments. The productivity signal, though, is likely to be coarser in the latter, conveying less information
about the true productivity.
We view FDI as distinct from portfolio investment with respect to the quality of management.
Foreign direct investors, by deﬁnition, acquire some signiﬁcant control over the ﬁrm they invest in.
They can then apply hands-on management (micro-management) standards that enable them to react
in real time to changing economic environments. This feature may stem from “intangible capital"
accumulated through a specialization by the foreign direct investors in a certain niche.9 Indeed, there is
some micro evidence in support of our theory. Djankov and Hoekman (2000) report that foreign direct
investors pick the high-productivity ﬁrms in transition economies.
We employ a gravity equation in order to shed some empirical evidence on the prediction of our
theory. We ﬁnd that indeed the abundance of “intangible" capital in the source countries (as proxied
by export commodity concentration) is positively correlated with FDI ﬂows to the host countries. Also,
the degree of corporate transparency in the host countries is negatively correlated with these ﬂows.
9See Gopinath (2001) for an interesting application of a search model for a study of FDI ﬂo w st od e v e l o p i n ge c o n o m i e s .





Host GDP Per Capita 0.643
(2.05)∗




Host Debt-Equity Ratio −0.000
(−0.05)
Instrumented Telephone Traﬃc 0.544
(1.88)
Source Export Concentration 4.192
(0.77)








Values of z statistics in parentheses
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
14Table 2: Source and Host Country Coverage and Sub-Periods
Panel A: List of Source Countries
Australia Austria Canada France
Germany Italy Japan Netherlands
Norway Sweden UK US
P a n e lB :L i s to fH o s tC o u n t r i e s
Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil
Canada Chile China Colombia Denmark
Ecuador Egypt Finland France Germany
Greece Hong Kong India Ireland Israel
Italy Japan Korea Kuwait Malaysia
Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway
Peru Philippines Portugal Saudi Arabia Singapore
South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan
Thailand Turkey UK US Venezuela
P a n e lC :S u b - p e r i o d s
1981-83 1984-86 1987-89 1990-92 1993-95



















Instrumented Telephone Traﬃc 2.929
(2.73)∗∗ 2.835
(2.68)∗∗
Source Export Concentration 60.389
(2.92)∗∗ 61.191
(2.97)∗∗






Host Debt-Equity Ratio −0.013
(−2.10)∗ −0.017
(−2.74)∗∗





Number of Observations 324 324
Log Likelihood -630.50 -629.15
Values of z statistics in parentheses
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** Signiﬁcant at 1%
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18APPENDIX: FDI, Domestic Investment and Growth
Table A1: Determinants of Domestic Investment
OLS TSLS




























Long-run eﬀect of FDI 0.76∗∗ 0.68∗∗
Long-run eﬀect of L 0.82∗∗ 0.35∗∗
Long-run eﬀect of P 0.12∗ 0.53∗
Notes:
1. Except for GNP growth rates, all other variables are measured as percentages of GNP.
2. Source: Hecht, Razin and Shinar (2000).
3. The second column of coeﬃcients (TSLS) reports the estimation of one equation of a
four-equation system; other endogenous variables are FDI, L and P.
4. A double asterisk stands for statistical signiﬁcance (at the one-percent level).
5. A single asterisk stands for statistical insigniﬁcance (at the ﬁve-percent level).
19Table A2: Determinants of GDP Growth
OLS TSLS
































Long-Run Eﬀect of FDI 0.10∗∗ 0.23∗∗
Long-Run Eﬀect of L 0.01∗ 0.01∗
Long-Run Eﬀect of P 0.06∗ 0.07∗
Notes:
Notes as for Table A1 apply also to Table A2.
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